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Abstract  
A critical issue for the future growth of institutional investor Stewardship and 
engagement over investee companies is whether it is compatible with the fiduciary 
duties of pension fund trustees. This study examines how a range of interpretations of 
fiduciary duties informs approaches to corporate governance. Using the data from 
thirty-five in-depth interviews with key decision-makers I reveal that trustees 
understand their fiduciary duties in a variety of ways, which underpins the intensity 
and methods of engagement. Four distinct approaches emerge: Disengagement, 
Employer Engagement, Fund Manager Engagement and Corporate Engagement. I 
provide novel and empirically grounded explanations of much theorized but little 
understood concept of fiduciary duty in relation to corporate governance. The paper 
also has significant policy implications in that it raises scepticism about realising 
aspirations for shareowner Stewardship and fiduciary standards within the investment 
chain.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The role and practices of institutional investors, and more specifically, shareholder 
engagement has been one of the central themes in ‘governance through ownership’ 
research for over seven decades (Daily, et al, 2003). Corporate ownership landscape is 
dominated by large-scale institutional investors like insurance companies, mutual 
funds and pension funds, which represent enormous pools of money invested in the 
stock market. According to the OECD pensions’ indicators (2013) in the UK pension 
fund assets as a share of GDP have reached 95.7% in 2011 while in the US this figure 
stood at 70.4%. Yet, ownership behaviour by pension funds is a little explored topic 
in corporate governance research.  
Using pension funds as the example, the paper explores factors that shape pension 
fund ownership behaviour. More specifically, how a range of interpretations and 
enactments of trustee’s fiduciary duty in relation to a pension fund informs pension 
fund behaviour vis-à-vis portfolio companies. Debates about the place of institutional 
investors in an era of ‘new financial capitalism’ (Davis, 2008; Jackson, 2008) and 
policy calls for a shift towards investor stewardship (The Stewardship Code, 2010) 
and fiduciary standards, necessitating loyalty and prudence within the investment 
world (The Kay Review, 2012) provide the contemporary theoretical and practical 
backdrop to this study.  
The paper provides novel empirical explanations to the much theorised debates 
about fiduciary duties in relation corporate governance issues (Sandberg, 2013) and 
gives answers to whether interpretations and enactments of pension fund trustee 
fiduciary duties are conducive to engaged share-ownership and long-term investment 
strategies.  
The paper is structured as follows: it begins by reviewing the literature on 
corporate ownership, institutional investors and pension funds to highlight the mixed 
evidence of investor’s role in corporate governance and that investors’ behaviour has 
also been viewed through the dichotomous ‘exit/voice’ (Hirschman, 1970) or 
‘owner/trader’ lens (Hendry, et. al, 2006). I argue that such conceptualisations are 
analytically unhelpful and not reflective of the current complexity of 
investor/company relationships. In order to move away from this dichotomy and 
account for the variety of positions and methods in respect of investor influence vis-à-
vis corporations I utilise Martin, et. al.’s (2007) analytical schema of investor 
engagement as an initial conceptual platform for this study.  
Following the discussion of the research design and process, I then draw on the 
qualitative data to demonstrate that Martin et al’s (2007) engagement framework 
cannot be fully applied to the case of pension funds because it does not explain how 
fiduciary duty, which is central to all trust-based pension schemes, shapes pension 
fund approaches to equity ownership. I reveal the variety of pension fund approaches 
to equity ownership, represented by the spectrum of engagement. Overall four distinct 
approaches emerge: Disengagement, Employer Company Engagement, Fund 
Manager Engagement and Corporate Engagement. I show that the variations in these 
approaches are explained by different meanings attached to the enactment of pension 
fund trustee fiduciary duties. It emerges that majority of trustees assume disengaged 
stance to equity ownership largely because trustees’ interpretation of their fiduciary 
duty to ‘act in the best interest’ (duty of loyalty) is interpreted as the duty to act in the 
best ‘financial’ interest of the members by seeking maximum returns on investment. 
Such interpretations raise scepticism about realising aspirations for shareowner 
Stewardship and fiduciary standards within the investment chain envisaged by the 
Stewardship Code (2010) and the most recent Kay Review (2012) because the 
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associated costs of engagement do not seem to justify the abstract benefits of 
stewardship and engagement. I conclude by considering the significance of these 
findings with respect to academic debates and offer some implications for further 
corporate governance research.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AS A GOVERNANCE MECHANISM  
Since Berle and Means (1932) examined the implications of the separation of 
ownership and control, ownership behaviour by institutional investors has been given 
a significant role and provided a theoretical platform for a substantial body of 
research exploring the consequences of institutional investor equity ownership 
(David, Hitt & Gimeno, 2001). Agency theory, which has dominated the field of 
corporate governance research, provides a basic rationale for why institutional 
investors, as owners of corporate equity, should engage with firms (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Leech and 
Leahy, 1991; Maug, 1998). The underlying assumption here is that the need to align 
the interests of managers (the agents) with those of investors (the principals) offers 
investors an incentive to monitor and participate in the company’s strategic direction 
(Mallin, 1994; Gillian and Starks, 2000; David, et. al., 2001; Hoskisson, et. al., 2002; 
Anabtawi, 2006; Johnson, et. al. 2010). For this reason, many scholars have argued 
that institutional investors may act and should act as engaged owners (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; Huddart, 1993; Admati, et. al., 1994; Maug, 1998; and Noe, 2002). 
Debate and interest in institutional investor ownership as a mechanism of corporate 
governance has been given fresh emphasis in an era of ‘Financial Capitalism’, 
characterised by greater concentration of ownership in the hands of institutional 
investors such as insurance companies and pension funds and at the same time an 
observable lack of commitment vis-à-vis portfolio companies   (Davis, 2008, Jackson, 
2008). 
Beyond academia, practitioners and policy-makers have also placed greater 
emphasis on institutional investors’ involvement in corporate governance. In the US 
this is evident from Conference Board reports (e.g. Tonello, 2006), whilst in the UK 
the financial crisis has served to heighten the expectations of policy-makers that 
institutional investors should act as stewards and engaged owners of shares 
(Ownership Commission, 2012; The Stewardship Code, 2010). The most recent Kay 
Report (2012) has been very critical of the way UK equity markets are geared towards 
generating short-term investment profits, emphasizing the need for a shift towards 
long-term and ‘fiduciary’ standards, necessitating loyalty and prudence within the 
investment world.  
All in all, the current legal and regulatory environment of shareholder protection is 
seen to create receptive conditions for investors to get involved in corporate 
governance while the ‘soft’ codes place expectations on institutional investors to act 
not as shareholders but as shareowners. However, the existing empirical evidence of 
investor engagement is decidedly mixed (Bainbridge, 2003; Dalton, et. al., 2007; 
Tilba, 2011). 
On the one hand, there is much written about investors actively engaging with 
investee companies. For example, in US and concentrating particularly on the 
relationship between institutional ownership and executive remuneration, Gillian and 
Starks (2000), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Watson Wyatt (2005) and Georgeson 
Shareholder (2005) indicate that some institutional investors are active in influencing 
executive compensation structures. Brandes, et. al. (2008) highlights that investors are 
4 
 
seeking to influence target firms’ policies, structure and governance.  In the UK, 
Mallin (1994; 2010) and Crespi and Renneboog (2010) document the increased levels 
of investor voting.  Aguilera, et. al. (2006) observe that UK investors increasingly get 
involved with their investee companies and concern themselves with issues such as 
board structure and effectiveness, executive remuneration, succession planning and 
corporate strategy. 
On the other hand, the case is made that institutional investors tend to be distant 
and disengaged owners of equity. In the UK, while examining a randomly selected 
sample of 250 companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange between 1988-1993 
Franks, et. al. (2001) indicate that holders of large share blocks exert little disciplining 
influence on the corporate management. Furthermore, Hendry, et. al. (2006) see 
institutional investors not as active ‘owners’ but primarily as financial ‘traders’ who 
happen to control key resources, as a result of their trading, but whose interests are 
divorced from those of long-term share owners. Both in the UK and the US Davis 
(2008) and Jackson (2008) observe an ‘ownership paradox’  whereby institutional 
investors seem to be growing in size and the concentration of their stakes, which gives 
them potential influence over managers, this concentrated ownership is liquid and 
without commitment. The financial crisis in 2007-2009 seems to further demonstrate 
investors’ lack of involvement in addressing poor corporate conduct.  
These are interesting and potentially significant puzzles for our understanding of 
institutional investors’ ownership behaviour vis-à-vis investee companies. 
Furthermore, the mixed empirical evidence about investor activism also seems to be 
framed around dichotomous ‘exit/voice’ (Hirschman, 1970) or ‘owner/trader’ 
(Hendry, et. al, 2006) conceptualisations, which appears rather blunt and simplistic. 
What seems to be absent from the discussion and remain unclear is how this 
‘owner/trader’ ’behaviour can be observed and explained. As holders of shares and 
suppliers of scarce and valued capital resources on which single firms are dependent 
for survival, institutional investors potentially have the power to influence their 
investee companies. Yet, prior research does not reveal more of the tapestry of 
institutional detail and a variety of influence positions vis-à-vis investee corporations. 
Conceptually, is there a possibility for a more nuanced categorisation of investor 
ownership behaviour? I suggest that explaining investor ownership behaviour and 
assessing whether investor Stewardship is realistic and feasible, would be more 
reflective of the complex empirical reality through the lens of engagement.    
 
Institutional Investor Engagement  
Martin, et al (2007) defines investor engagement as ‘the use of residual control 
rights by investors to influence the management process of a given portfolio 
company’ (p.19). The authors develop a framework of engagement practices, which 
fall between indirect and direct control. Within the framework, investor engagement 
is aimed at improving corporate management practises and in so doing enhancing 
corporate performance and shareholder wealth.  
The framework incorporates five approaches: indirect/laissez-faire, external, 
internal, negotiatory and direct engagement. Each of these approaches involves 
distinctive means of monitoring and disciplining corporate managers. At the 
minimum, Laissez-Faire Engagement characterizes distant, arm’s length financial 
arrangements where investors concede strategic and operational control to corporate 
management (their agents). Discipline is exercised by exit, threat of exit or capital 
withdrawal. Moving away from the distant and minimalistic approach to equity 
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management, External Engagement assumes that investors intervene to protect the 
workings of mechanisms of control through the capital market, without becoming 
involved in the internal operations of the firm. Discipline is exercised occasionally 
through shareholder resolutions. Internal Engagement sees investors influencing the 
internal governance of the firm through the appointment of independent, non-
executive directors, leaving the board to carry out its responsibilities to maximize 
shareholder value. Negotiatory Engagement involves investors discussing strategic 
and occasionally operational matters with corporate management. Influence is 
exercised through persuasion, reinforced by financial pressures (long-term funding 
arrangements through banks and corporate network allies). Direct Engagement 
involves dominant block holders who are able to control management directly through 
hiring and firing company’s management. The maximum form of engagement 
involves active intervention in the development and implementation of corporate 
strategy through meetings, voting, shareholder’s resolutions at the AGMs, requesting 
EGMs and joining forces with other investors to exert pressure on the company. 
All in all, Martin et. al’s (2007) classification of engagement  represents a more 
fruitful conceptual lens to explain investor behaviour. Notwithstanding, I will proceed 
to demonstrate that it cannot be fully applied to a specific case of pension funds, 
where trust-based fiduciary duty is central in informing pension funds’ approaches to 
stewardship and engagement. Although Martin et. al’s (2007) suggest that it is 
important to consider substantial distinctions in the character and conduct of 
investors, the framework represents broadly a ‘typical’ investor case and does not 
differentiate between investor types, which is crucial in explaining the investment 
behaviour (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Judge, et al, 2010).  
To fill this knowledge gap, I focus on pension funds and develop a model, which 
outlines a spectrum of engagement, which shows how trustees’ interpretations of their 
fiduciary duties inform various approaches to equity ownership and stewardship. In so 
doing I also identify new forms of engagement, specific to pension funds, which do 
not figure in Martin et. al’s (2007) work.  
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT: THE CASE OF UK PENSION FUNDS   
Although UK pension funds may no longer be the largest investors in the UK 
equities since their allocations have been steadily falling from 61.1% in 2006 to 
46.4% in 2010 and 35.1% in 2013 (The Purple Book, 2013), pension funds are 
particularly significant for stewardship because they seem to be designed to generate 
investment returns over longer-term and their investment approach (in theory) ought 
to reflect this (Ryan and Schneider, 2002; Davis, Lukomnik, & Pitt-Watson, 2006; 
Martin, et al. 2007). Through equity ownership pension funds potentially are in a 
position to play a significant role in the evolution of UK ownership (Franks, Mayer 
and Rossi, 2005), yet there remain few studies in relation to pension funds and 
corporate governance, some of which yield conflicting results.  
In the most recent study on UK pension fund ownership Tilba and McNulty (2013) 
find evidence of both engaged and disengaged approaches where interdependencies 
and gaps of accountability within the investment chain predispose most pension funds 
to investment short-termism and disengagement. Although the authors explain some 
of the drivers of pension fund investment behaviour, their analysis focusses more on 
the relationships within the investment chain and as such it cannot be complete 
without providing explanations to the crucial pensions’ concept of ‘trust’ encapsulated 
by the fiduciary duty in relation to stewardship.    
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The Trust and Fiduciary Duties  
Latin verb ‘Fiduciary’ means ‘to trust’ (Sandberg, 2013). UK pension funds 
originate from the Trust tradition, which dates back over 800 years. Under the Trust 
law pension fund trustees are entrusted with managing the assets for the individuals 
who could not adequately do so themselves. In other words, the trust is designed to 
protect the vulnerable when others have discretionary power to act on their behalf 
(The Law Commission, 2013). Thus, fiduciary duty requires ‘the duty of loyalty’ and 
‘the duty of care’ where trustees are given a central role (Sandberg, 2013).  
A year-long Kay Review of UK equity markets (2012) had criticized investment 
short-termism, which had dominated the market. Professor Kay considered that 
investment chains were too long with growing number of intermediaries between an 
investor and the investee company. A remedy to investment short-termism arose from 
his recommendation that ‘all participants in the equity investment chain should 
observe fiduciary standards in their relationships with their clients and customers’.   
However, is it unclear if this normative prescription holds any promise of 
investment behaviour change towards stewardship because as a concept ‘fiduciary 
duty’ is highly flexible, loose and uncertain. Sandberg (2011; 2013) suggests that it 
seems to be understood and enacted by practitioners in a variety of ways. There is a 
case to be made that the explanation of difference in approach to equity ownership, 
stewardship and engagement lays in different meanings and interpretations that 
pension fund trustees assign to their fiduciary duties.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
In the interest of research rigor and transparency this section explains the aim and 
rationale for the study; the research methods used; the sampling of pension funds; the 
process of gaining access; how the data were recorded and how the data were 
analyzed.  
 
Data Sources  
The interviewee sample was generated from the UK Top 100 pension funds by the 
size of assets because, arguably it is the biggest and well-resourced pension funds that 
would be in a position to engage with the investee companies.  All interviewees were 
selected with careful consideration of their professional role and the expected 
contribution to the research project. Data collection resulted in 35 in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with pension fund trustees, executives, investment officers and 
investment intermediaries. All interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed and 
uploaded into NVivo for subsequent analysis. Martin et al.’s (2007) forms of 
engagement served as a way to open up the discussions around pension funds 
approaches to equity ownership and corporate engagement. 
 
Data Analysis 
 The process of data analysis began in June 2013 and was inductive and 
interpretative and involved recoding the initial findings and thoughts on the emerging 
themes, discussing it with pensions, investment, legal and policy experts, going back 
to the interviews and identifying the key research themes and findings.   
 Content analysis was used to analyse the interview transcripts. Content analysis is 
a research method that examines the content of communication. Savall, et. al. (2008) 
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note that the robustness of content analysis depends on the reliability of the 
techniques used and the validity of the results. To warrant the robustness and the good 
quality of this data analysis, I used the techniques similar to those used by Dacin, et. 
al. (2010) and Tilba and McNulty (2013), which consisted of a series of steps. I used 
NVivo9, a qualitative research software, which assisted and facilitated the analysis of 
my interview data.   
 In the first step of the analysis, interview transcripts, entered in NVivo as text files, 
were coded on the basis of ‘in vivo’ words. These comprised phrases, terms, or 
descriptions offered by interviewees, all revolving around pension fund investment 
management and covering the initial research questions. Such descriptions included 
comments on pension fund characteristics, investment processes, roles and duties of 
strategic investment decision-makers. These formed the first-order codes. Altogether I 
had 611 coded passages at the end of this process.    
 The second step of the analysis, involved looking for codes across interviews that 
could be developed into second-order codes. For example, comments on the first –
order code such as pension fund investment management could be further grouped 
into codes or ‘tree nodes’ labelled ‘Investment Trends’, ‘Asset Allocation’, ‘Equities 
Management’. The interview passages discussing particularly pension fund 
engagement were then grouped under a ‘sub-node’ labelled ‘Pension Fund 
Engagement’. Following Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) recommendations, the second-
order codes were then refined through triangulation of interviews with documentary 
analysis to produce a set of higher-level nodes. 
 The third step of the analysis involved looking for links between second-order 
codes and higher-level nodes so that I could collapse these into theoretically distinct 
themes. For example, ‘Pension Fund Engagement’ was further grouped into nodes 
labelled ‘methods’, ‘issues’, ‘meanings’, ‘examples’, ‘challenges’, ‘fund manager 
mandates’. This was a recursive rather than a linear process; I moved iteratively 
between the first- and second-order codes and the emerging patterns in the data until 
adequate conceptual themes emerged (Eisenhardt, 1989; Dacin, et. al., 2010).  
 The fourth step of the analysis involved organizing the emerging conceptual 
themes into the overarching dimensions that eventually underpinned the key findings 
and theorizing. Four dimensions of pension fund engagement strongly emerged here: 
Disengagement; Corporate Sponsor Engagement; Fund Manager Engagement; Direct 
Corporate Engagement. NVivo allowed the interview content to be analysed more 
systematically by using codes, keywords, word frequencies, reference counts, 
quantifying theme coverage and theme cross-comparisons. I also aimed to ensure that 
during the interpretation, the data are linked with the research questions and concepts 
and there is a close fit between the data and the research claims (Easterby-Smith, et. 
al., 2008). To help improve the accuracy of information respondents’ feedback was 
also sought because only the research participants can legitimately assess the 
credibility of the results (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Usually this was done during the 
interview process by reiterating the respondent’s statements to make sure the intended 
message was understood correctly.  
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS  
 One of the key observations this study makes is that pension funds engage with 
investee corporations in a variety of ways, underpinned by a distinction of either 
distance or a degree of involvement. Operationalizing Martin, et. al’s (2007) 
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conceptual framework of investor engagement I consider pension fund  ownership 
behaviour against different interpretations of trustee fiduciary duty and make the 
following observations. 
 Firstly, there is a variation in pension fund approach to equity ownership. Pension 
funds can be seen as positioned along the analytical spectrum of engagement, where 
some pension funds seek to exert more influence than others over investee 
companies. A Disengaged approach to equity ownership is positioned at the extreme 
minimalistic end of the spectrum, is contrasted with Corporate Engagement at the 
extreme involved end of the spectrum. Between the two extreme forms in the model, 
are a corporate Employer Engagement and Fund Manager Engagement.  
 Secondly and significantly, the forms of engagement are largely informed by 
trustees understanding and interpretation of their fiduciary duty, which also takes 
different forms. In the case of Disengaged pension funds trustees understand their 
fiduciary duty primarily as the duty to act in the best financial interests of the pension 
fund members. In contrast, where Corporate Engagement happens it is also informed 
by trustee’s understanding of their ‘duty of care’, which extends to environmental, 
social and corporate governance issues.  
 Thirdly within corporate Employer Engagement, the duty of loyalty is broadly 
interpreted to mean acting in the best financial interests but also meaning that the duty 
of care extends to considering economic well-being of their sponsoring company, 
prompting engagement in the governance of their employer rather than investment 
portfolio companies. In the case of Fund Manager Engagement, trustees see it as their 
duty to maximize the investment returns but also engage with the fund managers in 
order to improve corporate governance of their investment portfolio for the financial 
benefits of pension fund members. It appears that the most meaningful strategic 
engagement is rare and happens ‘behind closed doors’.  
 Finally, positioning the data along the analytical spectrum of engagement suggests 
that most pension funds do not have a direct contact with their investee corporations 
and are disengaged. In this form, engagement is delegated to the outside investment 
managers and their mandates are overwhelmingly oriented towards producing the 
investment returns. 
 The main findings are offered with the introduction of the spectrum of pension fund 
engagement presented in Figure 1, which relates different interpretations of fiduciary 
duties to forms of engagement. I use this Figure as a guide and a reference point to 
present and explain the findings, starting first, with the majority of distant Disengaged 
pension funds. 
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Figure 1. The Spectrum of Pension Fund Engagement  
 
 
 
 
Disengagement  
I find that overall pattern of pension fund behaviour towards equity investment is 
Disengaged. Positioned at the very minimalistic end of the spectrum, this form of 
equity ownership resonates with Martin et al’s (2007) Laissez-Faire investor 
engagement, which assumes that pension delegate all to do with equity management 
to their external investment fund managers and focus the fund manager mandates on 
investment performance. Out of 35 interviews undertaken for this study, 22 interviews 
suggest that majority of pension funds do not have direct relationships with their 
investee companies, nor do they seek to influence their fund managers in any way 
when it comes to corporate governance or ESG issues. Moreover, there appears to be 
very limited monitoring and no clear prescription about what engagement policy 
should look like and how it should be effectively communicated to the fund managers. 
In practice, involvement either with the investee companies or with the fund managers 
on the issues of corporate governance is minimal.  
Significantly, disengaged approach to equity ownership is informed by trustees’ 
understanding of the purpose of the trust and what the trustees duties are in relation to 
that trust. Trustees and fund executives consider that pension funds are there to 
provide financial security to members. A trustee’s duty in relation to the trust is to 
ensure that pension fund assets are invested in a way to secure the financial interests 
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of pension fund members. This predominant view was summarised by one trustee in 
the following way:  
 
‘Coming back to basics, a trustee has got to act in the members’ 
best interest – that’s just a principal trust law and that’s extended 
in the pension’s law context to say that trustees have got to act in 
the members best financial interest… you’ve got to promise that the 
person will get his final salary on his retirement and that there is 
enough money there, because you promised to pay it’.  
 
Another trustee of a pension fund with assets under management around £2.3 billion 
echoes this view:  
 
‘We’ve always taken a view that we’ve got fiduciary duty, which 
is to get the appropriate level of return to meet our liabilities 
going forward, so we don’t take account all those ESG issues, 
we don’t screen on that basis’  
 
A Pensions Policy Manager within one of UK largest pension funds with assets under 
management exceeding £30 billion explains the role of the pension fund ‘trust’ and 
related duties in their investment decision-making in the following: 
 
 ‘The trust has been given, so if you are a trustee on a board you 
don’t fiddle with the terms of the trust, you actually deliver the trust 
and the trust says that you pay a pension of X to somebody, while 
you made sure the investments are made wisely in order to pay that 
benefit to that person, so our trustee board is doing just that. You 
have to just deliver the trust you have been given’.  
 
All in all, the core fiduciary duty of loyalty to act in the best interests of pension fund 
members is broadly understood by trustees as acting in the best financial interests, i.e. 
the trustee’s role in relation to the trust is to deliver and pay benefits when they fall 
due to the members of the scheme. Although trustee’s fiduciary duty gives the trustees 
a fair amount of discretion in making investment decisions, provided they do it in 
good faith and take on appropriate investment advice, the common perception was 
that engagement was simply not something that trustees supposed to be doing. 
Furthermore, spending money on engagement was also considered ‘unjustified’ use of 
pension fund’s resources because of the perceived lack of evidence about the 
‘immediate benefits’ of engagement. 
 
Employer Engagement   
 Employer Engagement does not figure within Martin, et. al.’s (2007) conceptual 
framework because this form of engagement is specific to occupational pension 
funds. It is a peculiar form of engagement because it assumes that pension funds can 
be both distant and involved in corporate governance. On the one hand, pension funds 
have very little interest in how their portfolio companies are governed, delegating 
investment management to external fund managers. At the same time, these schemes 
pay significant attention to governance of their own corporate sponsor. In this form of 
engagement, a lot of corporate governance discussions between trustees and the 
senior managers are routine and are taking place ‘behind the scenes’, involving 
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dialogue about the overall strategic direction of the company rather than structural 
governance issues like remuneration or the board structure.  
 Involvement with an employer means working towards a better and more 
financially secure future for the company. In turn, this means fulfilling fiduciary duty 
by ensuring a strong and steady flow of pension contributions, which is in the 
interests of the pension fund members and the fund. In other words, engaging with 
the corporate sponsor is seen as part of trustees’ duty of care to secure employer’s 
contributions and in so doing to grow the fund. Disengagement with portfolio 
companies appears to be the enactment of the duty of loyalty to protect the financial 
interests of the fund members by focusing on investment performance of the 
investment managers rather than the individual investee firms. As trustee of one 
industry wide pension fund with assets under management exceeding £22 billion 
explains:  
 
‘As a trustee one of my first and foremost duties is to ensure that 
there are adequate funds to pay the benefits to the members for as 
long as the benefits are due to be paid. In order to achieve that you 
have to look at the strength of the sponsor of the company. One of 
the huge influences on the strength of our sponsor is the fact that 
we’ve got this guarantee of continuing business for the next 25 
years.’  
 
Interviewees explain that the reputation and the strength of the corporate sponsor, or 
‘employer’s covenant’, is key, particularly when it comes to weighting up the value of 
the pension promise that the employer has made to its members. Similarly to 
disengaged funds, majority of respondents within this form considered themselves as 
not being in a position to influence ‘other’ companies because the shareholdings in 
individual companies were small and represented only a ‘vehicle for delivering 
revenues’ needed to pay out pensions to members. 
 
Fund Manager Engagement  
While Martin, et. al. (2007) characterizes fund manager engagement as external 
engagement, suggesting that investors simply rely on the capital market as a 
disciplining mechanism, I find that in the case of pension funds, this form relates not 
to pension funds’ activity vis-à-vis investee corporations directly, but pension funds 
engaging ‘one level down’ - at the fund manager level. Here, pension funds put 
pressure on their fund managers (through the mandate) to engage with the investee 
companies on pension fund’s behalf. 
While a fund manager is expected to produce returns on investment, the manager is 
also expected to exercise share ownership rights by voting, using either pension fund 
guidelines or guidelines of other industry organizations, primarily Pension Investment 
Research Consultants (PIRC) or the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). 
As shown in Figure 1, predominantly local authority pension funds are associated 
with this form of engagement. Eight local authority and three occupational pension 
fund interviews reveal that local authority pension funds exert more pressure on their 
fund managers because they themselves are under the public scrutiny and demand for 
greater transparency, particularly when it comes to disclosing of voting policies. 
Pension fund engagement with the investment fund managers is largely informed 
by how trustees and pensions’ executives interpret their roles and duties. Interviews 
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indicate that in the eyes of trustees, pension funds, as institutional investors, should 
not only focus on paying out pensions but also act as responsible owners of shares by 
exerting influence on the investee corporations through their investment fund 
managers. Trustees value higher standards of corporate governance as a way to 
safeguard against poor performance and believing that more responsible ownership 
would benefit the scheme’s members in the long-term. A trustee from a local 
authority pension fund (£ 5 billion) encapsulates this view: 
 
 ‘Motivation to engage with the managers was to recognize that 
pension funds were investing a great deal of money and shouldn’t 
be complacent about what is going on in the underlying 
investments. Governance does go to value and you know if a 
company is being properly run according to good standards 
actually that should be in our best interests anyway because 
ultimately it should go to value’.    
  
All in all, the discussions with trustees about their fiduciary duties indicate that by 
engaging with the investment fund managers trustees broadly fulfil their duty of 
loyalty to act in the best financial interests of the pension fund members, but 
‘stretching’ those interests to include non-financial (ESG) interests as means of 
enhancing the value of pension fund investment and the value of a pension fund.  
 
Corporate Engagement 
 Within this study, only two occupational and local authority pension funds 
represented by the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF) directly engaged 
with investee companies by conducting company research and monitoring, voting and 
proxy voting, writing letters, and holding face-to-face meetings with senior 
management and boards of directors about structural and strategic corporate 
governance issues. These pension funds also invested in specialist corporate 
governance teams in-house or worked with external industry bodies such as PIRC, 
RImetrics or NAPF. Martin, et. al. (2007) associate such engagement methods with 
the Negotiatory form of engagement. In discussing governance issues with senior 
managers, pension fund respondents gave preference to the more subtle and routine 
conversations ‘behind the scenes’ and ‘trying to create and maintain long-term 
relationships with the companies’.  
 One underlying motivation behind engagement relates to trustees considering that 
engagement adds value and produces better financial returns for the pension fund. 
Since better investment performance is in the best financial interests of the members, 
engagement becomes part of trustees’ fiduciary duty of loyalty. For example, an 
Executive Member of LAPFF and a trustee of a pension fund with assets under 
management of over £3 billion highlights that engagement:  
 
‘…adds value. It is not just altruistic…it is actually good 
business…there is evidence that it does add value to your shares… 
as much as 8% to the company value...It probably adds 20%, which 
is a lot’.   
 
The other motivation relates to trustees’ personal values and sense of altruism and 
responsibility that resonate with being a responsible owner of shares, providing not 
only capital but also concerned with environmental, social and governance issues 
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for the greater good of society. The more altruistic stance towards engagement is 
more evident in the local authority pension fund context. One of the reasons for 
such ‘concentration’ of responsible investment interests within the public sector 
pension funds could be the fact that the local authorities are more pressured to have 
higher standards of public accountability and more is expected of these funds in 
terms of wider social, environmental and corporate governance issues. As a local 
authority pension fund CEO (£2 billion) explains: 
 
 ‘We are a public sector body. In our day-to-day dealings good 
corporate governance, transparency with the public is key in 
everything we do, so we are applying that rationale to the pension 
fund… we have real high standards of public accountability and we 
just believe that that should run through our investments and if we got 
a chance through that investment to influence – we should be doing it’  
 
Just by virtue of being in public sector, local authority pension funds appear to stand 
out in their attempts to integrate social responsibility into their investment practice. 
The local authority pension fund trustees ‘feel that they have a duty’ to engage with 
their investee companies due to their political and ideological principles. 
 
DISCUSSION  
 Researchers have observed changing patterns of UK corporate ownership, 
characterized by the rise of institutional investors as an important class of 
shareholders (Mallin, et. al., 2005). Many corporate governance scholars highlight 
institutional investors, including pension funds, as a significant governance 
mechanism for lessening agency conflicts of interest (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 
Leech and Leahy 1991; Huddart, 1993; Admati, et. al., 1994; Maug, 1998; and Noe, 
2002). Coincidentally, regulators and policy-makers are also concerned about the 
roles that institutional investors do play and should play in corporate governance 
(The Stewardship Code, 2010; The Kay Review, 2012). However, despite 
heightened interest in investor role in corporate governance, the evidence of investor 
engagement is mixed and theorisation about investor ownership behaviour seems to 
be rooted in a simplistic and dichotomous conceptualisation of either ‘exit/voice’ 
(Hirschman, 1970) or ‘owner/trader’ (Hendry, et. al, 2006) frameworks. The findings 
of this study suggest that problematisation of theory of ownership expressed through 
‘exit/voice’ or ‘owner/trader’ lens is limited in capturing the complexity of 
institutional investor landscape and therefore inadequate in explaining current 
complexity within relationships between investors, their financial intermediaries and 
companies. 
 This study moves away from the simplistic categorisation of investor behaviour 
and uses Martin, et al. (2007) framework of investor engagement  as a way to 
operationalise the concept of ‘stewardship’ and also applying this framework to a 
specific case of pension funds. Martin, et. al. (2007) have offered a way to re-
conceptualise investor behaviour and account for a variety of positions and influence 
methods that may exist vis-à-vis investee corporations. However, their framework 
broadly depicts a ‘typical’ investor, which does not fit the specific case of pension 
funds because the framework does not explain how trust-based fiduciary duty is 
informing pension funds’ approaches to stewardship and engagement. I reveal that 
trustees understand and enact their fiduciary duties in a variety of ways and that 
largely informs pension fund approaches to equity ownership and stewardship. This 
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has allowed this study to put forward a more detailed conceptualisation of pension 
fund approaches to equity management. 
 Through the Spectrum of Engagement I demonstrate how the intensity of 
engagement is related to how trustees sometimes ‘stretch’ the meaning of fiduciary 
duty from the very minimalistic idea of acting solely in the best financial interests by 
focusing on generating investment returns to considering other factors such as the 
welfare of the employer and other environmental, social and governance factors. 
This study also identifies new forms of engagement, specific to pension funds, which 
mean different things to trustees and do not figure in Martin et. al’s (2007) 
framework. I also explain which of these approaches to equity ownership is most 
appropriate under which conditions. For example, Employer Engagement is a 
peculiar form of engagement, specific only to pension funds. It assumes that trustees 
can be both distant and involved in corporate governance. Although, trustees 
consider their duty to engage with the sponsoring employer because that would mean 
looking after the interests of both current and future members, pension funds 
associated with this form of engagement also act as distant and passive investors, 
delegating all to do with equities management to their fund manager and focusing 
their mandates on generating investment performance. In this way, ‘acting in the best 
interests’ assumes financial interests and generating best returns on investment to 
ensure that pensions are paid out. Although Employer Engagement seems to be very 
involved form of strategic engagement, it cannot be placed at the maximum end of 
the spectrum because it only assumes involvement with the parent company, where 
pension funds are being disengaged vis-à-vis other corporate stock held in other 
companies. 
 Similarly, while Martin, et. al. (2007) characterizes Fund Manager Engagement as 
external engagement, suggesting that investors simply rely on the capital market as a 
disciplining mechanism, I find that in the case of pension funds, this form relates not 
to pension funds’ influencing corporations directly, but through their investment 
fund managers. This happens because trustees believe that their duty in relation to 
the trust ‘stretches’ to include stewardship activities vis-à-vis companies they own on 
the stock market. Furthermore, Martin et. al., (2007) also suggest that through 
Internal Engagement investors may influence the internal governance of the firm by 
appointing independent and non-executive directors, leaving the board to carry out 
its responsibilities to maximize shareholder value. In the case of pension funds, I did 
not find any evidence of such engagement practices. 
 This paper also provides novel empirical insights into theoretical debate on the 
nature of fiduciary duty Sandberg (2011; 2013). This literature review notes that as a 
concept ‘fiduciary duty’ is highly flexible, loose and uncertain. Sandberg (2011; 
2013) suggests that it seems to be understood and enacted by practitioners in a 
variety of ways. However, no empirical evidence has either confirmed or disproved 
this idea. By focusing on trustee roles, the study offers an empirically grounded 
explanation of how fiduciary duty is interpreted by the actors concerned and how it 
informs pension funds’ approach to equity ownership and engagement. Therefore, 
my research also helps explain why the literature on pension fund engagement has 
uncovered inconsistent results.   
 
Policy Implications 
The paper has significant policy implications. The Kay Review (2012) has 
proposed a concept of fiduciary duty as a remedy to fix investment short-termism 
within financial markets by requiring that ‘all participants in the equity investment 
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chain should observe fiduciary standards in their relationships with their clients and 
customers’ (Principal 5). This study shows that this approach is problematic at best. 
Using the concept of fiduciary duty and applying it in a legal sense is unrealistic 
because it is a very fuzzy concept, which is understood and enacted in different ways 
by trustees.  
My empirical evidence of the variations in interpretations of trustees’ fiduciary 
duties and the subsequent differences in pension fund approaches to equity ownership 
and stewardship suggest that, in practice, there is confusion and uncertainty within the 
law and further clarification of the current law is needed, particularly if there is 
evidence to suggest that UK pension fund trustees believe that the law precludes them 
from ‘unjustifiably’ spending pension fund resources on engagement and considering 
non-financial factors. The law does not oblige ‘best interests’ to be interpreted solely 
in terms of financial best interests, but allows trustees to take a broader approach, 
provided that this does not compromise the purpose of the trust. Trustees need to be 
fully aware of that especially in the light of my findings that most pension funds are 
primarily associated with Disengagement.  
The change in ownership behaviour towards long-term and more responsible 
investment is not likely to be achieved through simply applying a vague construct of 
fiduciary duty. The application of fiduciary duty becomes even more complex as we 
go along the investment chain of intermediaries.  
 
CONCLUSION  
This study is a contribution to a sparse empirical literature on pension funds and 
their role in corporate governance. It reframes the analysis of institutional investor 
behaviour away from a dichotomy of ‘exit’ or ‘voice’ (Hirschman, 1970), ‘owners’ or 
‘traders’ (Hendry, et al, 2006) towards a richer conceptualisation of pension fund 
approaches to equity ownership informed by fiduciary duty and expressed through a 
spectrum of pension fund engagement.  Given the present context of governance 
reform and the current emphasis on stewardship by institutional investors this study 
also sets out new avenues for future governance research, particularly in terms of 
institutional investor accountability. If we are to address the conflicts between what is 
in the interests of institutional investors and the ultimate beneficiaries and the interests 
of the firms in which they invest in, we need to pay more attention to the position of 
the pension fund trustee, in its capacity as a fiduciary, vis-a-vis the fund beneficiaries. 
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